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RUTH M. HILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROLLIN L. 
McNITT, as Executor, etc., Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Duration.-The husband's obli-
gation for support of a former wife is an obligation growing 
out of the marital relationship; such obligation would, without 
reference to any property settlement agreement or divorce 
decree, normally cease on the husband's death subject only 
to the wife's rights under the community property laws, and 
in the event of a divorce and the wife's remarriage the obliga· 
tion for her support would normally fall on the then husband. 
[2] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration.-Under Civ. Code, § 139. 
as amended in 1951, specifically declaring that "Except as 
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing" the obligation 
of the husband shall cease on his death or on remarriage of 
the wife, provisions in a property settlement agreement or in 
a divorce decree for support and maintenance terminate on 
death or remarriage whether or not the property settlement 
agreement is integrated and insevera ble, where neither the 
agreement nor the decree provides that the support payments 
are to continue beyond the obligor's death or the obligee's re-
marriage, and the wife may recover only the amount that was 
due lind owing prior to decedent's death. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Interest.-Judgments ordinarily 
bear interest at the statutory rate, but only after an order 
for payment is an executor obliged to pay any general claim 
against the estate (Prob. Code, §§ 951, 952), and it is only after 
such order is made that it bears interest at the statutory rate. 
[4] ld. - Claims - Interest. - A former wife presenting a claim 
against her deceased husband's estate, based on a property 
settlement agreement lind a divorce decree, is entitled to 
interest at the statutory rate on the amount owed at the time 
of decedent's death only after the executor has been ordered 
to pay her claim. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, .Judge. Reversed. 
[2] Death of husband as affecting alimony, notes, 18 A.L.R. 1040; 
101 A.L.R. 323; 39 A.L.R.2d 1046. See also CaI.Jur.2d, Divorce and 
Separation, § 221. 
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 612; Am. 
Jur., Executors< and Administrators, § 408. 
!ricK. Dig. References: [1,2] Divorce, § 214; [3,4] Decedents' 
Estates, § 506. 
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Action on a claim against an estate. Judgment for plaintiff 
reversed. 
Glenn R. Watson and Robert G. Beverly for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Edythe Jacobs for Def('noant and Appellant. 
CARTER, J .-This is an appeal from a judgment allowing 
and establishing a creditor's claim for $7.500 filed by Ruth M. 
Hilton against the estate of her deceased husband. Hal H. 
Hilton, based on a property settlement agreement entered into 
between them and on an award made in an interlocutory decree 
of divorce. The executor of the husband's estate. Rollin L. 
McNitt and the claimant both appeal. Mrs. Hilton's appeal is 
only on the denial of interest on her claim. 
The major point involved on this appeal is the effect of the 
1951 amendment to section 139 of the Civil Code. The portIun 
of that amendment here involved provides, that "Except as 
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of 
any party in any decree, judgment, or order for the support 
and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the 
death of the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other 
party. " 
In the case at bar the parties enter('d into a property 
settlement agreement on Jaly 25, 1953, pending divorce 
proceedings to be commenced by Mrs. Hilton. The agreement 
provides that it is the mutual intention of the parties to 
etYect a final and complete settlement of their respective prop-
erty rights with reference to their marital status "to each 
other." The agreement also provides that "Husband shall 
pay to wife for her support and maintenance $300 a month, 
payable on the first of each and every month commencing 
with the lst day of August, 1953. and continuing until the 
first day of July, 1956." Other provisions in the agreement 
divide among the parties certain properties owned by them. 
and paragraph X provides that" Each of the parties in con-
sideration of the agreements of the other herein expressed 
hereby waives, releases and relinquishes to the other all claims 
each may now have, or might hereafter otherwise acquire 
against the other, as husband or wife, or otherwise, arising 
out of the marital relation." On the same day. the parties 
entered into a "stipulation inre alimony, attorney feeR, court 
costs, title and possession of property" in accord with the 
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aD'plicable provisions in the property settlement agreement 
and stipulated further that defendant was to pay plaintiff 
"the sum of $300 per month, commencing on August 1, 1953. 
and continuing thereafter on each and every month, on th~ 
first day of such month until the first day of July, 1956." 
On the stipulation was written "Approved and so ordered" 
and the signature of the trial judge. On August 21, 1953, 
plaintiff was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce which 
provided that "It is further ordered that defendant pay to 
the plaintiff the following sums: $300 per month commencing 
October 1st, 1953, and on the 1st day of each month there-
after until the 1st day of July, 1956 .... " 
Mr, Hilton died about July 25, 1954, and Mrs. Hilton re-
married about September 18, 1954. Mrs. Hilton presented a 
creditor's claim for 25 monthly installments of $300 (a total 
of $7,500) beginning on July 1, 1954, under both the property 
settlement agreement and the interlocutory decree of divorce. 
The executor approved the claim to the extent of $300 for 
the support and maintenance due July 1, 1954, prior to 
Hilton's death, and rejected the balance of the claim because 
it was based on support and maintenance of Mrs. Hilton 
as the former wife of the decedent and that such right termi-
nated with Hilton's death. Mrs. Hilton filed suit against the 
executor for the whole claim. The trial court held that the 
contract was an integrated and inseparable part of a property 
settlement agreement; that the monthly payments were in-
stallments in settlement of the parties' marital rights rather 
than payments for support and maintenance. It was con-
cluded that the obligation for the monthly payments did not 
terminate upon the death of the decedent or on the remarriage 
of the wife. 
The executor contends that an integrated property settle-
ment agreement is subject to section 139 of the Civil Code as 
amended in 1951 and that provisions in a property settlement 
agreement or in a decree for support and maintenance termi-
nate on death or remarriage unless there is a provision in the 
agreement or decree which negates the intention that the pay-
ments should so terminate. With thifl contention we agree. 
[1] The husband's obligation f.-1r support of a former 
wife is an obligation growing out of the marital relationship, 
This obligation for support would, without reference to any 
property settlement agreement, or decree of divorce, normally 
cease upon the husband's death subject only to the wife's 
rights under the community property laws of this state. In 
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the event of a divorce and the wife's remarriage the obligatioll 
for her support would. normally, fall upon the then husband. 
Prior to 1951, section 139 of the Civil Code provided thaI 
upon the remarriage of the wife, the husband was no 10llger 
obligated for her support. This, then. was the anllounced 
public policy of this state prior to 1951. The 1951 Legislature 
amended section 139 so as to provide that unless the partie!> 
otherwise agree in writing, the obligation of any party in any 
decree, judgment, or order for the support and maintpnan('p 
of the other party shall terminate upon the dpath of the 
obligor or the remarriage of the obligee. As was held in Talia-
ferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 424 [270 P.2d 1036]. 
"Section 139 [as it read prior to the 1951 amendment] places 
no limitations upon the rights of husband and wife to contract 
with each other as they please, and if the husband for ade-
quate consideration contracts to give support beyond that 
for which he is strictly obligated, he has the right to thus freely 
contract with his wife. This is not being imposed upon him 
by the power of the court, but is something which he under-
takes voluntarily, and in the present ease, with advice of 
counsel." [9] lJ:lasmuch as the amendment is speeific to the 
effect that "Except as otherwise agreed by the parties ill 
writing" the obligation of the husband shall cease upon his 
death or the remarriage of the wife we must hold that since 
neither the agreement nor the decree here provided that the 
monthly support payments were to continue beyond the death 
of the obligor or the remarriage of the obligee plaintiff may 
not prevail except for the month which was due and owing-
prior to decedent's death. The agreement was executed subse-
quent to the 1951 amendment and the parties and their attor-
neys are presumed to know the law applicable to such property 
settlement agreements. It would appear that had the parties 
intended that Mrs. Hilton was to receive a certain sum of 
money without regard to her remarriage or the obligor's death 
it would have been a simple matter to make their intentions 
known in the property settlement agreement. In vie'v of the 
language of the amendment that "except as otherwise agreed 
in writing" the payments for support and maintenance termi-
nate upon the death of the obli~or or remarriage of the wife 
we are of the opinion that such payments terminated upon 
the death of the obligor. 
We hold, thereforp, that the 1951 amendment to section 
139 is applicable wheth('r or Il'lt tll(· rroperty settlem('llt agree-
ment is integrated and inseverable. In other words, if 
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monthly payments are provided for support and maintenance 
or alimony such paymcnts will cease by force of the language 
of section 139 of thc Civil Code unless the parties agree in 
writing that the paYlIH'nts are to continne despite the reo 
marriage of the wife or the dcath of the husband. 
Mrs. Hilton claims that she is entitled to intercl:>L u11 the 
judgment. Section 730 of the Probate Code provides that a 
judgment against an executor conclusively establishes the 
validity of the claim for the amount of the judgment and 
that the executor must pay the amount ascertained to be dne. 
[3] Judgments ordinarily bear interest at the statutory rate. 
Howcver, only after an order for payment is the executor 
obliged to pay any general claim against the estate (Prob. 
Code. §§ 931, 952). This court said in Estate of Bell, 168 Cal. 
253, 2G8, 259 [141 P. 1170], that" [I]t is settled by our deci. 
sions that the allowance of a claim against a solvent estate is 
not equivalent to an ordinary jUdgment. It is a judgment 
only in a qualified sense, and does not attain the force and 
dignity of an absolute judgment until an order of court is 
made directing the executor or administrator to pay it. Until 
then it is simply an acknowletlged debt of the estate, bearing 
interest at the contraet rate. It is only after such an order 
is made that it bears interest at the statutory rate." And in 
Estate of Girard, 110 CaLApp.2d 203. 204 [242 P.2d 669]. 
the court stated that" The only question presented to us is 
whether a non· interest· bearing debt of a decedent bears inter· 
est at the statutory rate from the date of the allowance and 
approval of the creditor's claim. We have concluded that 
under the existing statutory law it does not." [4] It follows, 
therefore. that plaintiff is entitled to interest at the statutory 
rate on the amount owed at the time of decedent's death only 
after the executor has been ordered to pay her claim. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree that 
the 1951 amendment to Civil Code, section 139 applies to 
support provisions in an integrated agreement incorporated 
in Ii. divorce decree entered subsequent to the effective date of 
that amendment. Before that amendment the obligation to 
support under the provisions of an integrated agreement did 
not t('rminate on death or remarriage unless the agreement so 
provided. (Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [303 P.2d 
84 CARNEY v. SIMMONDS [49 C.2d 
.339].) If the obligation to support incorporated in a divorce 
uecree was not part of an integrated agreement, it always 
terminated on death or remarriage. (Civ. Code, § 139.) Thus, 
there was no necessity for the 1951 amendment unless it ap· 
plied to support provisions in integrated agreements. 
In my opinion, however, the obligation in the present case 
did not terminate on death or remarriage, for the parties 
"otherwise provided." True, they did not specifically men· 
tion death or remarriage, or any other contingency, but by 
providing that the payments should continue until the "first 
day of July, 1956" they agreed that the payments were not to 
terminate for any reason before that date. By specifying that 
date, they necessarily precluded any other. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J'J concurred. 
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for a rehearing and 
application to augment the record were denied October 17, 
1957. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
